UIdaho Law

Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law
Not Reported

Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs

2-18-2016

State v. Baker Appellant's Brief Dckt. 43552

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/not_reported
Recommended Citation
"State v. Baker Appellant's Brief Dckt. 43552" (2016). Not Reported. 2775.
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/not_reported/2775

This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by the Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs at Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Not Reported by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. For more information, please
contact annablaine@uidaho.edu.

SARA B. THOMAS
State Appellate Public Defender
I.S.B. #5867
SALLY J. COOLEY
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
STATE OF IDAHO,

)
)
Plaintiff-Respondent,
)
)
v.
)
)
MEGAN ERIN BAKER,
)
)
Defendant-Appellant.
)
________________________________)

NO. 43552
ADA COUNTY NO. CR 2012-5592
APPELLANT'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Pursuant to a plea agreement, Megan Baker pled guilty to one count of
possession of a controlled substance, methamphetamine.

She received a unified

sentence of seven years, with two years fixed, but the district court retained jurisdiction.
The district court placed Ms. Baker on probation after her rider; however, when
Ms. Baker violated the terms of her probation, the district court revoked probation.
On appeal, Ms. Baker contends that the district court abused its discretion in
revoking her probation.
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Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
On December 26, 2011, Megan Baker gave birth to a baby girl, S.B., in Weiser,
Idaho. (State’s Exhibit 1, p.3; R., p.52.) After S.B. was born, Ms. Baker’s urine tested
positive for THC.1 (State’s Exhibit 1, pp.6-7; R., p.39, 52.) During a well check visit by
the Idaho Department of Health and Welfare approximately two weeks later, on
January 10, 2012, Ms. Baker was questioned about her drug use, and provided a
sample to be tested for illegal drugs. (R., pp.39-40; 10/1/12 Tr., p.8, Ls.6-21.) When
interviewed, Ms. Baker admitted to officers that she would test positive for marijuana
and that she had used methamphetamine twelve days before S.B. was born.
(R., pp.39-40; 10/1/12 Tr., p.8, 13-22.) The sample Ms. Baker provided was positive for
amphetamines, methamphetamines and THC. (R., p.40; 10/1/12 Tr., p.8, Ls.15-21.)
On April 16, 2012, the State charged Ms. Baker with one count of felony
possession of a controlled substance, methamphetamine and/or amphetamine, and one
count of misdemeanor possession of a controlled substance, marijuana. (R., pp.27-28.)
The State filed a Part II enhancement for a second offense under the Uniform
Controlled Substances Act as Ms. Baker had a previous conviction, nine years prior, for
delivery of a controlled substance. (R., pp.33-34.)
Counsel for Ms. Baker filed a Motion to Dismiss in which Ms. Baker argued that
the mere presence of a controlled substance in her system coupled with a vague
admission cannot amount to a sufficient legal basis to uphold a conviction for
1

The record is not clear whether Ms. Baker’s urine tested positive for the substance
tetrahydrocannabinol (“THC”), the active compound in marijuana, or whether it tested
positive for “Carboxy-THC,” a commonly found marijuana metabolite that is not a drug
or intoxicating substance. See Reisenauer v. State, Dep’t of Transp., 145 Idaho 948,
950-951 (2008).
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possession of a controlled substance. (R., pp.39-41.) After hearing the arguments of
counsel, the district court denied Ms. Baker’s motion to dismiss. (R., p.59; 10/1/12
Tr., p.10, Ls.4-9.)
Ms. Baker entered a conditional guilty plea to the charge of felony possession of
a controlled substance, preserving her right to challenge the district court’s denial of her
motion to dismiss on appeal; in exchange, the State agreed to dismiss the
misdemeanor possession charge and to limit its recommendation to an underlying
sentence of seven years unified, with three years fixed, and to recommend probation,
with a period of time in county jail.

(R., pp.60-67, 69-70; 10/15/12 Tr., p.11, L.24 –

p.13, L.17.) The district court accepted Ms. Baker’s plea and ordered a substance
abuse evaluation, a mental health evaluation and a Presentence Investigation (“PSI”).
(10/15/12 Tr., p.24, Ls.18-23.) The district court imposed a unified sentence of seven
years, with two years fixed, and retained jurisdiction over Ms. Baker for a period of up to
365 days. (R., pp.72-73; 12/3/12 Tr., p.42, Ls.5-8.) Ms. Baker filed a timely pro se
Notice of Appeal. (R., pp.75-79.) On appeal, she asserted that the district court erred
in denying her motion to dismiss, but the Idaho Court of Appeals affirmed the decision
of the district court in an unpublished opinion, State v. Baker, No. 40613, Unpublished
Opinion No. 476 (Ct. App. Apr. 24, 2014).
At the conclusion of the rider program, the district court placed Ms. Baker on
probation for a period of seven years. (Limited Clerk’s Record on Appeal (“Supp. R.”),
pp.13-18.)
A report of probation violation was filed against Ms. Baker which alleged that
Ms. Baker had failed to attend/complete programming, smoked methamphetamine,
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spice and bath salts, changed residence without permission from her probation officer,
consumed alcohol, and failed to make herself available for supervision.

(Supp.

R., pp.19-28.) Ms. Baker admitted to violating some of the terms and conditions of her
probation. (Supp. R., p.41; 6/22/15 Tr., p.4, L.6 – p.5, L.24.) Pending her sentencing
on the probation violations, Ms. Baker was released on bond. (Supp. R., p.42.) During
that period of time, the State filed a motion to revoke bond alleging Ms. Baker failed to
check in with pretrial services and bond was revoked. (Supp. R., pp.43-47, 50.)
The State filed a second motion for probation violation which alleged Ms. Baker
failed to report to her probation officer, failed to submit to a urinalysis test, failed to
maintain full-time employment, and failed to allow herself to be supervised. (Supp.
R., pp.52-56.)

Pursuant to negotiations with defense counsel, the State agreed to

withdraw the second motion for probation violation. (Supp. R., p.61.) In exchange, the
defense agreed to stipulate to a prison sentence, not to ask for bond, and agreed to
allow the State to argue the new alleged conduct. (8/17/15 Tr., p.5, Ls.5-14; Supp.
R., p.61.)
The district court revoked Ms. Baker’s probation. (Supp. R., pp.63-65.)
Ms. Baker filed a motion requesting leniency under I.C.R. 35, and she submitted
a brief in support of the motion. (Supp. R., pp.66-70.) That motion was denied without
a hearing. (Supp. R., pp.79-80.)
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Ms. Baker filed a timely Notice of Appeal. (Supp. R., pp.71-73.) Ms. Baker
contends on appeal that the district court abused its discretion by revoking her
probation.2
ISSUE
Did the district court abuse its discretion when it revoked Ms. Baker’s probation and
executed her unified sentence of seven years, with two years fixed?
ARGUMENT
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Revoked Ms. Baker’s Probation And
Executed Her Sentence
Mindful that Ms. Baker agreed to be sentenced to prison, Ms. Baker asserts that
the district court abused its discretion when it revoked her probation and executed her
original unified sentence of seven years, with two years fixed. 3 She asserts that her
probation violations did not justify revoking probation, especially in light of the goals of
rehabilitation and the fact that the protection of society could be best served by her
continued supervision under the probation department.
In light of the significant progress Ms. Baker made while on probation, her
probation violations did not justify revoking probation.

2

There are generally two

Ms. Baker does not assert that the district court erred in denying her I.C.R. 35 motion
as she did not include new or additional information in support of the motion. See
State v. Huffman, 144 Idaho 201, 203 (2007) (holding “[a]n appeal from the denial of a
Rule 35 motion cannot be used as a vehicle to review the underlying sentence absent
the presentation of new information.”)
3
Ms. Baker stipulated to the execution of the previously suspended sentence in
exchange for the State’s dismissal of the second motion for probation violation.
(8/17/15 Tr., p.5, Ls.5-14; Supp. R., p.61.) Ms. Baker told the district court at
sentencing that she would like to participate in a therapeutic community program or
have work center options, and that she was “okay with having [her] time imposed.”
(10/29/15 Tr., p.13, Ls.9-11.)
5

questions that must be answered by the district court in addressing allegations of
probation violations: first, the court must determine whether the defendant actually
violated the terms and conditions of her probation; and second, if a violation of
probation has been found, the trial court must then decide the appropriate remedy for
the violation.

State v. Sanchez, 149 Idaho 102, 105 (2009). “The determination of

whether a probation violation has been established is separate from the decision of
what consequence, if any, to impose for the violation.” Id. (quoting State v. Thompson,
140 Idaho 796, 799 (2004)). Once a probation violation has been found, the district
court must determine whether it is of such seriousness as to warrant revoking probation.
State v. Chavez, 134 Idaho 308, 312 (Ct. App. 2000). However, probation may not be
revoked arbitrarily. State v. Adams, 115 Idaho 1053, 1055 (Ct. App. 1989). The district
court must decide whether probation is achieving the goal of rehabilitation and whether
probation is consistent with the protection of society. State v. Leach, 135 Idaho 525,
529 (Ct. App. 2001). If a knowing and intentional probation violation has been proved, a
district court’s decision to revoke probation will be reviewed for an abuse of discretion.
I.C. § 20-222; Leach, 135 Idaho at 529.
Only if the trial court determines that alternatives to imprisonment are not
adequate in a particular situation to meet the state's legitimate interest in punishment,
deterrence, or the protection of society, may the court imprison a probationer who has
made sufficient, genuine efforts to obey the terms of the probation order.

State v.

Lafferty, 125 Idaho 378, 382 (Ct. App. 1994).
Ms. Baker could continue receiving the help she needs to avoid relapsing again
while she resides in the community, thus the goal of protection of society would be
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achieved. Ms. Baker asserts that the district court abused its discretion in finding that
her probation violations justified revocation.
CONCLUSION
Ms. Baker respectfully requests that this Court remand her case to the district
court with an order that she be placed on probation or that her case be remanded to the
district court for a new probation violation hearing.
DATED this 18th day of February, 2016.

___________/s/______________
SALLY J. COOLEY
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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